Righteous people are scrupulous to avoid any financial impropriety. Therefore, they are very careful to hold onto whatever they have legitimat ely acquired. Thus Yaakov crossed the Yabok River to retrieve small jars that he had inadvertently left there (Chullin 91a). The Torah assumes that just as Yaakov avoided any financial impropriety, so too we are all equally scrupulous to avoid any hint of financial misdeeds. This assumption is based on the idea that “Our forefathers’ actions predict those of future generations” (Ma’aseh avot siman la-banim). Recognizing this, the Torah tries to make sure that we do not lose money unnecessarily, and thus it provides certain leniencies where financial loss is involved. The Sages call this “Torah sensitivity to people’s finances” (HaTorah chasah al mammonam shel Yisrael). We see this sensitivity in a number of areas. For example, before a Kohen decides whether a nega (blemish) in someone’s home is tamei (impure) or tahor (pure), he first instructs the homeowner to remove all the moveable items from the home, in order to protect him from possible financial loss. This is because if the Kohen declares the blemish impure, items in the home would become tamei as well, and would need to be destroyed. Additionally, in the Beit HaMikdash, various items were made of less expensive materials to save money. Thus the kalpi (the box used on Yom Kippur to hold the lots designating which of the two goats was to be sacrificed and which was to be sent away and killed) was made from wood, not gold or silver. The shovel (for the incense) and the mouthpieces of the shofars (which were blown on fast days) were made from silver rather than gold. Another example of the principle is that when a person is obligated to offer a sacrifice, he is explicitly exhorted not to sacrifice everything that he has. Rather, the Torah says (Vayikra 27:28) that he offers “from anything that is his” (mi-kol asher lo). Elsewhere he is instructed to offer in accordance with his means (Devarim 16:10). There is also a general rule that one should not spend more than one fifth of his wealth on any mitzva. Nevertheless, there are times a different principle applies: “Ein aniyut bimkom ashirut” (“We do not introduce poverty in an opulent place”). Therefore, in the Beit HaMikdash, things were not done in a penny-pinching fashion, but rather on a grand scale. For example, broken items were not repaired but replaced, and the wine libation offered with the daily morning offering was poured from a golden goblet. It would seem that deciding which of the two principles is applicable in any given situation is left to the discretion of rabbinic authorities, who can balance the possible financial loss to people against issues such as giving proper honor to the worship of G-d.

At first glance it would seem that we can derive the principle of “Ein me’arvin simcha besimcha” (“We do not celebrate two happy events simultaneously”) from a verse in Parshat Vayetze. Lavan said to Yaakov, “Complete the week of this one and we will give you the other one too (to marry)” (Bereishit 29:27). We see that each happy event should be celebrated individually. However, the Talmud (Moed Katan 9a) derives this principle from the behavior of Shlomo at the dedication of the Beit HaMikdash. He made sure that the week-long dedication of the Temple did not overlap with the week-long holiday of Sukkot. Instead, there were fourteen consecutive days of celebration (1 Melachim 8:65). There is logic behind this rule. Someone who is celebrating two occasions at the same time cannot fully focus on either one. This is why we do not have weddings on Yom Tov or Chol HaMo’ed (the intermediate days of a festival). An interesting question arises. May we have weddings on Purim? If the rule is derived from Shlomo’s behavior, it is possible that the prohibition of mingling celebrations is only relevant to biblically mandated celebrations (such as Sukkot, when the Torah commands: “You are to rejoice on your festival”); it would not be relevant to Purim, which is rabbinic. On the other hand, if we derive this principle from Lavan, it would apply to rabbinically mandated celebrations. After all, the joy during the seven days following a marriage is rabbinic, and yet we see that Lavan (with Yaakov’s agreement) was careful not to mingle the celebrations. In practice, this principle was accepted only with regard to weddings. Other celebrations, such as the festive meals accompanying a circumcision or a Pidyon HaBen (redemption of the firstborn), take place even on festivals. This difference may be because the celebration of a marriage is considered the most joyful of all celebrations. An indication of this status is that it is only for a wedding that we make the blessing of “SheHaSimcha BiMe’ono.” Despite this rule, according to Torah law a man may marry several women at the same time under the same chupah (wedding canopy). Additionally, according to the letter of the law, a number of couples could be married under the same chupah (if not for the fear that doing so would cause enmity and jealousy between the families involved). It would seem then that the problem of “Ein me’arvin” is limited to cases when there are two different types of events being celebrated, as is the case with having a wedding on Yom Tov. In contrast, when the celebrations are of the same type, this principle would not apply. Based on this, it would seem that Yaakov could have married Leah and Rachel on the same day, as long as each couple could have their own sheva berachot celebrations.

The voices of Yaakov and Esav were different and distinct, yet Yitzchak was unable to discern the difference between the two. According to Ramban (Nachmanides), Yaakov intentionally disguised his voice so that he would sound like his brother. Based on this, some halachic authorities (poskim) conclude that one may not testify to a person’s identity based solely upon voice. Thus if someone overheard someone else giving instructions to write a bill of divorce (get) for his wife, and he identified the husband based on his voice, we do not rely upon this testimony. The Torah specifically defines a witness as one who saw or knew about something that happened (Vayikra 5:1). This means that we can rely only on what someone has seen. It may also explain why we cannot accept testimony from someone blind. In contrast, Rambam (Maimonides) does not seem to agree with this exegesis. He maintains that the reason a blind person’s testimony is not accepted is because the verse requires a witness to be able to see. However, someone sighted may identify someone else by voice. Thus we may carry out the death penalty for someone who curses G-d (mekallel) or someone who persuades people to worship idols (meisit), based on the testimony of someone who heard them. Additionally, a husband is permitted to be intimate with his wife based on his recognizing her voice, even if the room they are in is dark (or the husband is blind) and he cannot see her. Nevertheless, some rule that one should not rely upon voice identification if there are reasons to doubt the identification. A story is told of a married man who returned to his town after many years of absence. He was identified based on his voice, though his appearance had changed drastically. He then died. Some rabbinic authorities ruled that his wife should not be allowed to remarry, because of the possibility that he had been misidentified based on his voice, leaving open the possibility that her husband was still alive. Others permitted her remarriage because they felt that the change in appearance could be reasonably attributed to aging, so the identification of the husband based on his voice could be relied upon. If voices are unique to individuals and can be used to identify them, how was Yaakov able to change his voice so that he sounded like his brother Esav? The Marcheshet suggests that Yaakov was able to do this successfully only because he and Esav were brothers. It would seem, then, that if we wish to permit a woman to remarry based on testimony about her husband’s voice, we would need to verify that the voice heard could not have been the voice of her brother-in-law.

From Parshat Vayera, the Talmud (Shabbat 127a) learns that “The mitzva of Hachnasat Orchim is greater than greeting the Divine Presence (Shechinah).” Nowadays, opportunities to greet the Divine Presence are few and far between, so we are rarely faced with this choice. However, it does sometimes happen that tending to guests has an impact on other mitzvot. For example, let us say that guests arrive at one’s home unexpectedly on Shabbat itself, and they need a place to stay. In order to accommodate them, he must work hard to clear space for them. Though normally we would avoid exerting ourselves on Shabbat, since this is for a mitzva it is permitted. Bear in mind, we are not talking about neighbors who drop in for a cup of coffee, but travelers who have nowhere else to go. Another possible conflict presents itself if one is planning to attend a shiur (Torah lecture) when unexpected guests arrive. Should he sacrifice Torah study for Hachnasat Orchim? On the one hand, the Talmud (ibid.) states that “The mitzva of Hachnasat Orchim is greater than waking up early in the morning to go to the beit midrash (study hall).” On the other hand, the Mishnah (Peah 1:1) states that “Talmud Torah keneged kulam,” the study of Torah supersedes all other mitzvot. Hachnasat Orchim is certainly included, as it is mentioned explicitly in the same mishnah. Some resolve this seeming conflict by explaining that one’s Torah study takes precedence over Hachnasat Orchim only when there are others who will host the visitors if he does not. Alternatively, it may be that Hachnasat Orchim takes precedence over waking up early to go to the beit midrash. In contrast, when the conflict is between hosting guests and Torah study itself, Torah study takes precedence.

Let us say a child was mistakenly circumcised before the eighth day. Would there be a need, on the eighth day, for a symbolic drop of blood to be drawn (hatafat dam brit)? The Rashba maintains that in this case hatafat dam brit would not be required. It is true that if a baby is born already circumcised, some opinions require hatafat dam, but this is only because the Torah states (Vayikra 12:3): “the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (yimol besar orlato). Even when a child is born circumcised, usually some part of the foreskin remains. However, in our case the baby no longer has any foreskin at all. Nevertheless, the Rashba’s opinion is problematic. The verse instructs: “On the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Uvayom hashemini yimol besar orlato). This seems to require circumcision specifically on the eighth day. Rav Chaim of Brisk explains that while the mitzva of circumcision is specific to the eighth day, the requirement of hatafat dam brit is not. Thus if the hatafat dam was performed as part of circumcision before the eighth day, nothing more need be done. In contrast, both the Shach and the Taz believe that if a child was circumcised too early, there must be hatafat dam brit on the eighth day. They see this as analogous to the requirement of hatafat dam if someone was circumcised at night (which is forbidden) rather than during the day (as required).

“All the fountains of the deep opened” (Bereishit 7:1). This is how the Torah describes the beginning of the flood. However, at the conclusion of the flood the Torah states: “And the fountains of the deep closed” (8:2), omitting the word “all.” Our Sages derive from this that not all the fountains of the deep were closed. Those which benefit humanity, such as the hot springs of Tiberias (Chamei Teverya), were left open (Rashi). When Jewish law speaks of cooking, it is limited to cooking over a fire or any derivative thereof. This is true whether the subject is cooking on Shabbat, roasting the Paschal lamb, or cooking milk with meat. Since the Torah prohibition of cooking on Shabbat is limited to cooking with fire, one is not liable for cooking with the hot springs of Teverya or the sun (Rashi on Shabbat 39a). If we could harness the sun’s heat to cook on Shabbat, normative halacha might permit it (Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchetah, chapter 1, note 127). Some say that if a non-Jew uses Chamei Teverya to cook food, it may still be eaten by a Jew. Since the heat source is not fire, the food is not considered to have been cooked by the non-Jew (and thus it is not forbidden on the grounds of bishul akum). Nevertheless, all agree that if non-kosher food is cooked in a pot using Chamei Teverya as the heat source, both the pot and the food become forbidden. Does this mean that the people of Teverya can save on their electric bills by using Chamei Teverya to kasher their kitchen items before Pesach? Not necessarily. Some maintain that if a pot absorbed the taste of prohibited food while on the fire, it can be rid of it only by fire, following the principle of “Kebol’o kach polto” (“An item ‘spits out’ absorbed food in the same way that it absorbed it”). If so, Chamei Teverya would not count for kashering purposes. Another interesting tidbit: women may use Chamei Teverya for purification purposes, but it may not be used for netilat yadayim (hand-washing before a meal). This is because hot water may be used for netilat yadayim only if the water started out cold and was later heated up. In contrast, water which was always hot (as is the case with Chamei Teverya) cannot be used for netilat yadayim. Some say that Chamei Teverya cannot be used for netilat yadayim because of its sulfur content, which makes it unfit to drink.

___ The Words of the Teacher and the Words of the Student Divrei HaRav VeDivrei HaTalmid A good defense attorney for the serpent in Parshat Bereishit could have argued that the serpent was not at fault for Chava’s sin. For since Chava had heard the words of both G-d (in the position of the teacher) and the serpent (in the position of the student), she should have listened to th e teacher – G-d. This is similar to the logic behind the principle of “Ein shali’ach li-devar aveirah” (“There is no agency when it comes to sinning”). Thus in a case where A instructed B to commit a sin for him (i.e., made him his shali’ach or agent), B is nevertheless liable for the sin he commits. In our case as well, Chava rather than the serpent would be culpable for her sin. This explanation follows Rashi. Another case in which there is a conflict between the words of the teacher and the words of the student is discussed in the context of the mitzva of Leket (gleanings of the field that must be left for the poor). A sheaf which falls during the harvest is considered Leket and belongs to the poor. Let us say the field’s owner declares the sheaf ownerless (hefker) as it falls. Can the rich then scoop up that sheaf? The Talmud answers that when we are faced with a disagreement between the words of the teacher (in this case, G-d Who commanded Leket) and the words of the student (the field’s owner), we must follow the words of the teacher. Thus the sheaf is considered Leket, and the field’s owner cannot declare it hefker. This principle applies not only when it is G-d and man who are squaring off, so to speak, but also in disagreements in where both sides are human. If a teacher and a student disagree about a point of halacha, the law follows the teacher.

When speaking of Yom Kippur, the verse (Vayikra 16:31) states: “Ve-initem et nafshoteichem” (“You shall afflict yourselves”). Forms of the word “inui” (affliction) appear four more times in the Torah in the context of Yom Kippur. This led our Sages to conclude that there are five prohibitions on Yom Kippur: eating and drinking, bathing, anointing, wearing leather shoes, and marital relations. The Jerusalem Talmud (Pesachim 4:4) explains that in the Temple, the showbread (lechem ha-panim) was usually distributed to the Kohanim on Shabbat. However, when Yom Kippur was on Shabbat, the bread was distributed after Yom Kippur, to make sure no one ended up eating it on the fast. This might indicate that even touching food is forbidden on Yom Kippur. Nevertheless, some permit touching food. They are not worried that anyone will end up eating it. This is because on Yom Kippur everyone’s thoughts are far removed from food, and everyone feels the trepidation of the Day of Judgment. (A popular Chasidic proverb states that even if all the fast days were eliminated, people would still fast on Yom Kippur, because who could eat on the Day of Judgment?) How then do those who are permissive understand the Jerusalem Talmud cited earlier? They would explain as follows. There is an opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud that when Yom Kippur falls on Shabbat, it is permitted to prepare for Sunday on Yom Kippur. If this is correct, why couldn’t the showbread be distributed on Yom Kippur and be eaten after Yom Kippur? It must be, concludes the Jerusalem Talmud, that one is not permitted to touch food on Yom Kippur, as he might be tempted to eat it. However, according to the accepted halacha (that it is forbidden to prepare on Yom Kippur for the next day), there is no need to introduce an additional reason (being tempted to eat on Yom Kippur) to explain why bread was not distributed when Yom Kippur was on Shabbat.

“Gather (hakhel) the people – the men, women, children, and the strangers in your midst, in order that they may hear and so learn to revere the Lord your G-d” (Devarim 31:12). This refers to the mitzva of Hakhel, which takes place on Sukkot at the conclusion of the Shemitah year. The Torah specifies the categories of people who are obligated to attend. Nevertheless, the verse’s inclusion of women may be limited, as we shall see. Our initial assumption would be that women are not obligated in Hakhel. Since it takes place once every seven years, it seems to be a positive time-bound commandment (from which women are exempt). Yet the Mishnah tells us that Hakhel is an exception to the rule. There is another reason why women would might still be exempt. According to many opinions, the obligation of attending Hakhel is connected to the obligation to travel to Jerusalem for the three pilgrimage festivals. Only property owners are obligated to do so. Someone who does not own land is exempt from both the pilgrimage and Hakhel. Thus, it is possible that the verse’s inclusion of women in Hakhel is limited to the small minority of women who own land. There is a disagreement about who is included in the category of children (taf) for this purpose. Some say that even the smallest children, namely nursing babies, must be brought to Hakhel. Others maintain that only children of educable age must be brought. According to this second opinion, who is watching over the little ones when all the parents are gathered in the Beit HaMikdash? If most women are exempt because they do not own land, this problem is solved. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the whole nation gathers to hear and study the word of G-d, while leaving all the little children to run wild (or under the supervision of non-Jews, or impure Jews who are forbidden from entering the Temple. This is further support for the possibility that most women stayed at home for

Parshat Ki Tavo touches on the mitzvot of bikurim (first fruits) and ma’aser sheni (a tithe consumed in Jerusalem). However, the details relevant to eating them are found elsewhere. The mitzva of eating bikurim appears in Devarim 12:5-6, and the mitzva of eating ma’aser sheni is in Devarim 14:23. Not only are these two mitzvot mentioned in Ki Tavo in close proximity to each other, but they have many similarities (for example, they are both eaten in Jerusalem in a state of purity). Accordingly, our Sages apply the laws of one to the other. There are some differences, though. For example, ma’aser sheni is eaten in Jerusalem by its owners, while bikurim are presented to the Kohanim when the owners arrive in Jerusalem. The declaration said when bringing ma’aser sheni to Jerusalem includes the phrase: “I have not eaten of it while in mourning” (Devarim 26:14). This means a person is required to eat ma’aser sheni joyfully. When he is mourning and shrouded in sorrow, he may not eat it. Because we apply the rules of ma’aser sheni to bikurim, a Kohen who is in mourning may not eat bikurim. Others derive the latter rule from the verse that states regarding bikurim that “You shall enjoy all the bounty” (Devarim 26:11). This requirement of joy applies not only to the field owners who bring their fruit to the Kohen, but also to the Kohen who is privileged to eat the fruit of the Holy Land. The mitzva of eating bikurim is so important that the Kohen who eats bikurim makes a special blessing (just as he does before reciting the priestly blessing): “Asher kideshanu be-mitzvotav ve-tzivanu le’echol bikurim” (“Who has sanctified us with His commandments, and commanded us to eat bikurim”).

Riddle: Can there be something that is permitted to a Jew but prohibited to a non-Jew? Answer: Yes. An example is the yefat to’ar (captive woman) discussed in Parshat Ki Tetzei. During war, if a Jewish soldier sees a beautiful woman (one of the enemy), he is permitted to take her captive and later marry her. How can the Torah permit such a thing? Rashi tells us that the Torah is responding to the evil inclination. In other words, “The Torah recognizes the force of the desires awakened in the violence of war. The Torah assumes that these powerful instincts will overpower many soldiers. These warriors will not be able to resist the desire to enter into sexual relations with the captive women. This creates a dilemma. Enforcement of the normal prohibition against relations with non-Jewish women would be impossible. Therefore, a strict legal framework was created for the inevitable relations. In other words, the Torah deemed it preferable for the relations to take place in this framework rather than outside of its laws” (Rabbi Bernie Fox). The above explains how a normally forbidden sexual relationship is permitted. Doesn’t the problem of theft remain? (Kidnapping is a type of theft.) Furthermore, the law of yefat to’ar applies even to a married woman. The answer is that the permission is limited to wartime. Just as it is permitted during war to conquer territory and take the property of the enemy nation, so too it is permitted to take captives, both men and women. However, this permission during war was given only to Jews. While non-Jews acquire property if they conquer it in war, they are not permitted to do so by Jewish law; only if they transgressed and stole property does it remains theirs. For non-Jews, even during war it is forbidden to capture property or people. For this reason, a non-Jew may not take captive a yefat to’ar (Sanhedrin 57a). The law of yefat to’ar applies only when the enemies are non-Jews. However, in cases of civil war between Jews (as we find in the biblical book of Melachim), the dispensation of yefat to’ar does not apply, as the verse says, “when you go to war against your enemies” (Devarim 21:10). Furthermore, even if the enemies are non-Jews, if an enemy woman is captured who is halakhically Jewish (because her mother was Jewish), the dispensation of yefat to’ar does not apply. Obviously, none of the laws of yefat to’ar apply in our times. It was relevant only for a voluntary war (declared by the king or Sanhedrin). Since we no longer have a king or Sanhedrin, we no longer engage in voluntary wars. Today’s wars are all obligatory, and a yefat to’ar is no longer permitted.

Dedicating a home in Israel is a mitzva. This becomes clear in the following verse, which addresses the question of who goes out to fight in wartime and who is sent home: “Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it (chanacho)? Let him go back to his home” (Devarim 20:5). Commentators explain that the verse is referring to a home that there is a mitzva to dedicate, and this must be in a place where there is a mitzva to live, namely the Land of Israel. Dedicating something (chinuch) is usually associated with a beginning. So, when the verse says that the person “has not dedicated it,” this means he has not started living there. More specifically, according to Targum Yonatan, it means he has not yet put up a mezuzah, while the Radak says that it means he has not yet had a meal there. Some believe that a meal served at a home dedication or house-warming is not considered a seudat mitzva unless there are divrei Torah (words of Torah). Others maintain that in Israel, the meal of a home dedication is automatically a seudat mitzva, even without accompanying divrei Torah. It is only in the Diaspora that divrei Torah are required in order to transform the meal into a seudat mitzva. Since buying a new item of clothing requires reciting the blessing of Shehecheyanu, it would certainly seem that buying a new home should require it as well. However, Shehecheyanu is recited only when the person is the only beneficiary of the new item. In general, a person buys a home for himself and his family. Therefore, Shehechiyanu is not recited.