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The Words of the Teacher and the Words of the Student
Divrei HaRav VeDivrei HaTalmid
A good defense attorney for the serpent in Parshat Bereishit could have argued that the serpent was not at fault for Chava’s sin. For since Chava had heard the words of both G-d (in the position of the teacher) and the serpent (in the position of the student), she should have listened to th
e teacher – G-d. This is similar to the logic behind the principle of “Ein shali’ach li-devar aveirah” (“There is no agency when it comes to sinning”). Thus in a case where A instructed B to commit a sin for him (i.e., made him his shali’ach or agent), B is nevertheless liable for the sin he commits. In our case as well, Chava rather than the serpent would be culpable for her sin. This explanation follows Rashi.
Another case in which there is a conflict between the words of the teacher and the words of the student is discussed in the context of the mitzva of Leket (gleanings of the field that must be left for the poor). A sheaf which falls during the harvest is considered Leket and belongs to the poor. Let us say the field’s owner declares the sheaf ownerless (hefker) as it falls. Can the rich then scoop up that sheaf? The Talmud answers that when we are faced with a disagreement between the words of the teacher (in this case, G-d Who commanded Leket) and the words of the student (the field’s owner), we must follow the words of the teacher. Thus the sheaf is considered Leket, and the field’s owner cannot declare it hefker.
This principle applies not only when it is G-d and man who are squaring off, so to speak, but also in disagreements in where both sides are human. If a teacher and a student disagree about a point of halacha, the law follows the teacher.
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