Non-Jews are prohibited from eating Eiver Min HaChai (a limb from a living animal). This law is derived from G-d’s directive to Noach: “But flesh – with its soul, its blood you should not eat” (Bereishit 9:4). Later, at Matan Torah (the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai), Jews too were forbidden to eat Eiver Min HaChai. This prohibition is derived from the sentence: “You shall not eat the life with the meat” (Devarim 12:23). If this prohibition had not been repeated, it would not have applied to the Jewish people, since we do not derive laws for Jews from stories that preceded the giving of the Torah. The basis of the prohibition is different for non-Jews and Jews. A non-Jew is not permitted to eat from an animal while it is still alive, while a Jew may eat from an animal only if it was slaughtered in accordance with halacha (shechitah). Thus if an animal was slaughtered properly by a Jew but is still twitching (mefarches) afterwards, a Jew may eat the meat since shechitah was performed properly. However, since shechitah is not relevant to a non-Jew, if he eats this meat he is transgressing the prohibition of Eiver Min HaChai.

Certain mitzvot are dependent upon light, whether daylight, moonlight, or candlelight. Mitzvot which require daylight include a Kohe n looking at nega’im (leprous lesions) to determine if they are impure, and a rabbi determining whether a particular stain renders a woman a niddah (menstruant). Additionally, rabbinic courts do not convene at night. There is one mitzva – Kiddush Levanah (the prayer sanctifying the new moon) – which requires moonlight. For some mitzvot, we are required to make use of candlelight. For other mitzvot, we are not allowed to make use of the light. For still other mitzvot, a candle is not required, but it still contributes honor and joy. Mitzvot for which we are required to make use of candlelight include the search for chametz on the night before Pesach. Shabbat and Yom Tov candles are meant to provide useful light. By helping people to avoid tripping and bumping into each other in the dark, the candles contribute to shalom bayit (peace in the home). The blessing over the light of the Havdalah candle is not recited unless one needs the light and derives benefit from it. This is one of the explanations for our custom to hold our hands up to the light and look at our fingernails during Havdalah. In contrast, one may not derive any benefit from the light of a Chanukah menorah. (This is to make it clear that the candles are being lit to publicize the miracle, and not for any other reason.) In earlier times, when the original Menorah was lit in the Beit HaMikdash, the Kohanim may have avoided using its light. (When guarding the Temple, they would carry torches to light their way.) Sometimes we light candles to enhance honor and joy. We do this in the synagogue, as well as during celebrations such as weddings, circumcisions, and festive meals. When studying the laws pertaining to light, an interesting question arises. May we substitute one type of light for another? For example, as we have seen, rabbinic courts convene only during the day. If a room is candle-lit, would the court be permitted to convene at night? Similarly, kosher slaughtering may not be done in the dark. If a room was lit up using a torch, would it then be permissible? Acharonim (15th to 20th century rabbis) disagree about this, with some insisting on sunlight for these activities. Now let us flip the question around. When candlelight is required, may sunlight or moonlight be used instead? May one search for chametz during daylight hours? Nowadays, these questions extend to electric lights as well. Some maintain that lightbulbs may be used as Shabbat “candles.” (This does not necessarily mean they can be used for Chanukah candles or a Havdalah candle, since the reasons for the lights in each case are different.) People relate that Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski (author of Achiezer) made a point of using incandescent bulbs for Havdalah (others say it was for Shabbat candles). He did this to demonstrate that electricity is considered fire in halacha. People would then understand that turning electric lights on or off on Shabbat is absolutely forbidden.

If a person has taken a vow (neder) but later regrets having done so, he may approach a rabbi to have it annulled. The Hebrew word for annulment is hatarah. Some Rishonim explain that this is related to the word le-hatir, to untie. Undoing a vow is like untying a knot. Others explain that it is related to heter (permissible) as opposed to issur (forbidden). According to them, Hatarat Nedarim means permitting the behavior that had been forbidden by the vow. There is a disagreement among the Tannaim as to the source for Hatarat Nedarim. Some say the source is the verse (Bamidbar 30:3), “He shall not break his pledge” (Lo yachel devaro). They expound: The one who undertook the vow cannot forgive (mochel) it, but someone else can forgive it for him. The other opinion is that Hatarat Nedarim has no basis in the written Torah at all. Rather, Moshe taught the people orally that when the verse says, “He shall not break his pledge,” it means one should not flippantly disregard his vow. Instead, if he truly regrets it and wishes to undo it, a rabbi can do it for him. The idea that there is no clear biblical source for Hatarat Nedarim is expressed in the Mishnah with the phrase “it is floating in the air” (Chagigah 1:8). When a rabbi annuls a vow, the annulment takes effect retroactively. It is as if the person never made the vow at all. In contrast, when a husband cancels his wife’s vow (Hafarat Nedarim), it takes effect only from the time he becomes aware of the vow and cancels it. How is a vow annulment actually done? The person who made the vow stands in front of one rabbi or three laymen. He explains that he regrets having made the vow, and would not have made it if he had realized all the consequences. They then say to him, “The vow is annulled,” “The vow is forgiven,” or anything similar. Some require that the phrase be recited three times, but this is just to make it feel more serious. According to the letter of the law, though, saying it once is sufficient.

G-d told Aharon, “Bring your fellow Levites from your ancestral tribe to join you and assist you when you and your sons minister before the Tent of Meeting” (Bamidbar 18:2). What will you be doing there? You will be guarding the Temple. But why would G-d’s Temple require guards? This “guarding” was to show the proper respect due to the Temple. In fact, this guard duty was considered one of the sacred services performed by the Kohanim and Leviim, and the Kohanim wore their priestly garments when they carried it out. (They would change out of the garments when sleeping between shifts, as it was forbidden to sleep while wearing them.) Since guard duty was considered a priestly service, some say that children could not take part in it, and that the watchmen had to be twenty or older. Even at the age of twenty, Kohanim and Leviim were not authorized to perform all the services, but they were permitted to do this. Because guard duty was a type of divine service, it should have been performed while standing. However, because it was for an extended period of time, the watchmen were permitted to sit when they were tired (though not to sleep, of course). In general, sitting in the courtyard of the Temple was not allowed, but in this case it was allowed as it was to enable the proper guarding of the Temple. There is a disagreement as to the extent of the guarding. The Rambam says it was done at night only. However, according to some commentaries on Mishnah Tamid, the guarding was done around the clock. Others distinguish between the different places that were guarded saying that some areas were guarded around the clock, while others were guarded only part of the time. Within this opinion, there is a disagreement about whether the part-time guarding was during the day or night.

Even though the entire Land of Israel was divided among the tribes, the city of Jerusalem is owned by all Jews and no one has a private stake in it. This applies to the land itself and not to the structures that are built on it. The buildings belong to whoever bought them. The communal ownership of the land has certain interesting halachic ramifications. For example: 1. Since all who ascended to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage festivals (regalim) were partial owners of the land, they could not be charged rent for their stay in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, it was in the interest of the locals to house the pilgrims, because they would benefit by receiving the skins of the sacrifices offered. Nowadays, though, no one can get out of paying for their stay in a hotel in Jerusalem. This is because in the meantime, non-Jews captured the land, and the Jews who later bought it are no longer obligated to subsidize the pilgrimages of the entire Jewish people. 2. Throughout the Land of Israel, one is not permitted to have a balcony that extends into the public domain. Rather, a person must limit his construction to his private property. However, in Jerusalem one is not permitted to build a balcony even on his own property, because the land belongs to everyone. 3. There is an additional special law pertaining to Jerusalem. Kilns are not allowed there (on account of the unsightly smoke). Actually, halacha does not allow a kiln within fifty cubits of any city in Israel. What is different about Jerusalem is that since no individual owns any part of it, no one would have been able to insist that his neighbor move his kiln outside the city limits if there weren’t a special ordinance to that effect.

The obligation to verbally confess applies in a number of situations. Perhaps the best-known type of vidui is the one that is part of the process of teshuvah (repentance), when people confess and express their regret for a particular sin they have committed. Another vidui is recited by an individual offering a Torah-mandated sacrifice for a particular sin, or by an individual who is being subjected to punishment by a rabbinic court for a particular sin. Vidui is also relevant to sins in general. This includes the Kohen Gadol reciting a confession for the nation on Yom Kippur, an individual reciting the traditional confession on Yom Kippur, or a person on the brink of death reciting a final confession. As part of teshuvah, a person must recite vidui for any transgression he or she has committed. This applies whether the transgression was of a positive or negative commandment, and whether the sin was performed willingly or unwillingly. Essentially, the mitzvot of vidui and teshuvah are interconnected; for there is no vidui if there is no teshuvah. For if someone confesses his sins but does not resolve to avoid repeating them, he is like someone who immerses for purity while holding a dead (and thus impure) animal in his hand (tovel ve-sheretz be-yado). Vidui is necessary for the completion of teshuvah. Though a person who regrets his sins in his heart is deemed completely righteous, he still needs to confess verbally in order to finish doing the mitzva of teshuvah. First, he stops sinning, resolves not to sin again and stops thinking about it, and regrets having sinned. Then he says vidui, giving voice to what he has already thought. Nevertheless, if he is unable to verbalize the vidui, he should at least think it. In Tanach, we find two types of vidui. One type is personal. Examples of this are the confessions of Kayin, King David, and Achan. The second type is collective. This can either be recited by an individual on behalf of the entire community (as did Moshe and Ezra the Scribe), or by the entire Jewish people collectively. As we said above, our Sages stress that if someone has sinned and recites the vidui but continues to sin, he is like someone who immerses in a mikvah while holding an impure animal. It makes no difference how many bodies of water he immerses in – he is still impure. However, once he throws away the dead animal and immerses in a kosher mikvah, he is instantly purified.

We are commanded to pay the wages of a worker at the proper time. Should a person not pay at the appropriate time, he is disregarding the positive commandment to pay on time (“be-yomo titen secharo”) as well as transgressing the negative commandment not to withhold wages (bal talin). However, such a transgressor does not receive lashes (malkot). For he is obligated to pay the money he owes, and when there is a negative commandment which requires payment there are no malkot. Additionally, transgressing this negative commandment involves not taking a required action (lav she’ein bo ma’aseh), rather than taking a forbidden one. Malkot are not given for a passive transgression. All this applies to cases in which the person who must pay makes clear that while he does not have the funds currently, he understands that he has an obligation to pay and plans to do so eventually. In contrast, if a person refuses to pay, or claims that he never hired the worker, he is transgressing five negative commandments and one positive one. This applies even when a worker is hired for hourly or daily work, and certainly applies to a worker who was hired on a daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, or seven-year (shemitah) basis. When a person commissions a craftsman to make something for him, the customer does not have an obligation to pay immediately upon the job’s completion. This is because the craftsman has in his possession the finished object, for which the customer supplied the material. If the craftsman supplied his own raw material, there is certainly no prohibition of bal talin if the customer does not pick it up immediately, since in this case the craftsman is considered a salesman rather than a hired worker. The prohibition of bal talin applies whether one hired a person, an animal, or an object. However, if when the contract is drawn up the employer stipulates that he does not have to pay immediately, then he does not transgress bal talin. Indeed, it is preferable that the conditions of the contract be clearly stated at the outset. This way, the employer can avoid a situation in which he has a cash flow problem and is unable to pay what he owes, thus transgressing bal talin.

Parshat Tazria begins with the obligation of a woman who gives birth (yoledet) to offer two sacrifices – a burnt offering (korban olah) and a sin offering (korban chatat). In practice, the husband is the one to go to the Temple with the offerings. (Today, due to our sins there is no Holy Temple and we cannot offer sacrifices. Instead, the husband is called up to the Torah and given an aliyah.) Various explanations have been given for why these offerings are necessary. However, the explanations largely ignore the korban todah (thanksgiving offering), which the yoledet must bring as well. This is because a yoledet is deemed to be sick, as we know from the laws of Shabbat. Someone who is sick and then recovers is obligated to bring a korban todah. Today, instead of the korban todah, we substitute prayers of thanksgiving On Yom HaAtzma’ut (Israeli Independence Day) we recite Hallel, while a private individual who experienced something miraculous recites the blessing of Ha-gomel: “Blessed are You, Lord our G-d, King of the Universe, Who bestows good upon the guilty, Who has bestowed every good upon me (shegemalani kol tov).” When does a yoledet today recite Ha-gomel? There are various opinions: 1. The yoledet herself recites the blessing a week after the birth. 2. The husband recites the blessing for her in her presence. He adjusts the language accordingly (“shegemalech kol tov” – Who bestowed every good upon you), and his wife responds Amen. 3. The husband recites the blessing when his wife is not present, adjusting the language accordingly (“shegamal le-ishti kol tov” – Who bestowed every good upon my wife). 4. The wife fulfills her obligation by listening when her husband gets an aliyah and recites the blessing of “Barchu et Hashem Ha-mevorach.” Another opinion completely exempts a yoledet from Ha-gomel. This is either because childbirth is such an everyday miracle that it seems natural, or because the blessing is designed to be said by someone who needed a miracle on account of his sins. Hence the blessing includes the expression “Ha-gomel le-chayavim tovot” (“Who bestows good upon the guilty”). A yoledet is not guilty of anything. She did not irresponsibly place herself in danger. On the contrary, she performed the mitzva of Pru Urvu. All this relates to an individual who gives birth. Only a number of decades ago, an entire nation was (re)born. This certainly requires us to praise and thank G-d for all that He has done for us.

The Temple Treasurer During Temple times, the Temple’s treasury (Hekdesh) was allowed to own Canaanite slaves, just as a private individual could. Therefore, we would have expected that just as a slave owned by a private individual could buy his freedom from his master, so too a slave owned by the Temple treasury could pay the treasurer (gizbar) and buy his freedom. However, this is not the case. The treasurer of the Temple may not grant a slave release. Rather, he must sell the slave to a private individual. The slave can then buy his freedom from the new owner (Gittin 38b). Why is the treasurer of the Temple empowered to deal with all monetary matters, but not empowered to free a slave? Rashi explains that the relationship of the Temple to a slave is different from that of a private individual to a slave. The Temple treasury does not actually acquire the body of the slave (kinyan ha-guf), but only his monetary value (kinyan damim). Since the treasury does not own the slave’s body, it cannot free him. The Meiri offers a different explanation. The reason the treasurer cannot free the slave is because only the slave’s owner can free him, and he is not the slave’s owner. The true owner of Hekdesh is the Almighty Himself, while the treasurer is just a functionary. Tosafot explains that if we give the treasurer the power to sell a slave, some might suspect him of not being sufficiently careful with Hekdesh assets. However, this interpretation is a bit surprising, as there is a principle that we trust the treasurers of Hekdesh to be acting faithfully. If we trust them with all other monetary matters, why should freeing slaves be any different? The reason may be as follows. We trust the treasurers implicitly as far as straight monetary matters are concerned. However, when it comes to freeing a slave – granting liberty to a human being – there are emotional and ideological concerns that may come into play. People might suspect that the treasurer’s altruistic wish to free a slave would lead him to do something disadvantageous to Hekdesh, for example accepting a lower price than he should for the slave.